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Health Insurance
Tax Credits and Health
Insurance Coverage
of Low-Income
Single Mothers
T

he Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA)
introduced a refundable tax credit for
low-income families who purchased
health insurance coverage for their
children. This health insurance tax credit
(HITC) existed during tax years 1991,
1992, and 1993, and was then rescinded.
Curiously, although many economists
have espoused a refundable tax credit
directed toward low-income families
(Burman et al. 2007; Cogan, Hubbard,
and Kessler 2005; Furman 2008; and
Pauly 1999, among others), no one has
estimated the effects of the HITC on
health insurance coverage.
This article summarizes the evidence
we report in a recent study (Cebi and
Woodbury 2009) in which we use Current
Population Survey data and a differencein-differences approach to estimate the
effect of the 1991–1993 HITC on health
insurance coverage of low-income single
mothers. Access to health care for lowincome women and their children is a
concern that extends well beyond health
policy. Indeed, for many TANF and
Medicaid recipients, lack of affordable
health insurance has been a key barrier

to escaping welfare. The findings of our
study suggest that during 1991–1993,
the health insurance coverage of single
mothers was about 6 percentage points
higher than it would have been in the
absence of the HITC. These findings
hardly suggest that an HITC would be a
panacea for low-income families’ access
to health care, but they do suggest that an
HITC could be an effective component of
a broader set of policies to expand access
to health care.
The Health Insurance Tax Credit,
1991–1993
When Congress passed OBRA, it
added a supplemental credit for health
insurance purchases to the basic Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) program.
This HITC was a refundable tax credit
for low-income workers with one
or more children who bought health
insurance—either employer-provided or
private nongroup—covering the children.
The credit offset only the cost of health
insurance—not copayments, deductibles,
or out-of-pocket health expenses. The
credit was refundable, so taxpayers with
no federal income tax liability could
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still receive a payment from the Internal
Revenue Service. The HITC was repealed
effective December 31, 1993, so it was
available only during tax years 1991,
1992, and 1993.
The HITC and the EITC had the same
eligibility criteria, and their schedules
were similar. For example, in 1991, a
taxpayer with earnings and a qualifying
child could receive a credit up to $428 if
he or she bought private health insurance
that covered the child. For households
with earned incomes of $1 to $7,140, the
credit was 6 percent of earned income.
For households with earnings between
$7,140 and $11,250, the credit was $428
(6 percent of $7,140), and for households
with earnings between $11,250 and
$21,250, the credit phased out at a rate
of 4.28 percent per added dollar earned.
In 1991, the average credit was $233, or
23 percent of the reported average annual
health insurance premium of $1,029. Also
in 1991, 2.3 million taxpayers received
health insurance credits of $496 million
(U.S. Government Accountability Office
1994).
Main Findings
To estimate whether the HITC affected
the private health insurance coverage of
low-income single mothers, we develop
a difference-in-differences analysis using
1988–1993 Current Population Survey
data on women aged 19–44 who worked
(had annual hours greater than zero),
were single (never married, widowed, or
divorced), and had less than a high school
education. We focus on high school
dropouts because these women are likely
to have low earnings and be eligible for
the HITC. (We cannot explicitly examine
low earners because the EITC creates
incentives for earners to change their
hours of work so as to qualify for the
credit, and the sample would be selfselected.)
We divide the sample of low-education
working single women into two groups—
those with children and those without.
The population potentially affected by the
HITC—the “treatment” group—was lowincome working families with children. If
the HITC had any effect on private health
insurance coverage, then the coverage
of low-income working families with
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children would have been greater than
otherwise between 1991 and 1993. As a
“control” group we use working single
women without children and with less
than a high school education. Because
they do not have children, these women
are ineligible for the HITC, but they
should face essentially similar labor
markets, tax policy (apart from the

The estimates suggest that
the Health Insurance Tax
Credit increased health
insurance coverage of working
single mothers by about 6
percentage points.
HITC), and other economic conditions
as low-education working single mothers
(the treatment group).
Figure 1 compares the average private
health insurance coverage rates of
working single mothers and of working
single women without children during
1988 through 1993. The coverage rate
for single women without children fell

between 1988 and 1993 (from 39.8 to
20.9 percent), with most of the drop
occurring after 1990 (from 37.8 to 20.9
percent). A likely explanation for the drop
after 1990 is the recession of 1991, which
would have reduced both employment
and access to employer-provided health
insurance of single women. The private
health insurance coverage rate of single
mothers also fell from 1988 to 1993, but
by much less—from 22.1 to 20.2 percent.
Did the HITC cushion the fall of health
insurance coverage of working single
mothers?
Table 1 shows a simple differencein-differences analysis of the HITC.
It displays the average private health
insurance coverage rates for single
mothers and single women without
children in the years before and during
the HITC. The first row shows that
health insurance coverage for single
mothers (the treatment group) fell by 2.4
percentage points between 1988–1990
and 1991–1993. The second row shows
that, over the same time period, coverage
fell for single women without children

Figure 1 Health Insurance Coverage Rates for Low-Education Working Single
Mothers and Low-Education Working Single Women without Children

Private insurance in own name
0.50

Single women without children

0.45

Single mothers (insurance covers
children)

0.40
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
0.05
0.00
1988

1989

1990

1991
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1993

NOTE: Data are from the March 1989–1994 Annual Demographic Supplements to the Current
Population Survey (CPS). The samples include working single women with less than a high
school education, with “working” as positive hours and positive earnings during the year. We
exclude women who are in school full time, those who are separated from their spouses, and
those who report being ill or disabled. Means are tabulated using CPS March supplement weights.
Sample sizes are 2,228 (single mothers) and 1,433 (single women without children).
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Table 1 Private Health Insurance Coverage Rates for Low-Education
Working Single Mothers and Low-Education Working Single Women
without Children

Single mothers

Single women without children

Difference
Difference-in-differences

Before HITC
(1988–1990)
0.244
(0.013)
[1,153]
0.389
(0.018)
[741]
–0.145
(0.022)
—

During HITC
(1991–1993)
0.220
(0.013)
[1,075]
0.299
(0.017)
[692]
–0.080
(0.022)
—

Difference
–0.024
(0.018)
–0.090
(0.025)
—
0.065
(0.031)

NOTE: See Figure 1. Figures are average private health insurance coverage rates. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. Sample sizes are in brackets.

(the control group) by 9 percentage
points. The implication is that, after
netting out the declining trend in
insurance coverage, the private health
insurance coverage of single mothers was
higher by 6.5 percentage points than it
would have been without the HITC.
Without further tests, it would be
unwise to conclude from the simple
analysis in Table 1 that the HITC had a
positive effect on the health insurance
coverage of single women with children.
Accordingly, we have developed
difference-in-differences estimates
controlling for individual characteristics
that are correlated with health insurance
coverage. The findings are similar to
those in Table 1. We have also performed
a number of falsification tests to check
whether the findings hold up under closer
examination. For example, because
women with more education tend to
have higher earnings and are less likely
to be eligible for the HITC, we would
expect to estimate a relatively small
(or no) effect of the HITC on working
single mothers with high school and
college. We would also expect the effect
of the HITC to be nil for single mothers
who do not work, again because they
were ineligible for the HITC. The data
support these expectations. Finally, we
have performed sensitivity tests to check
whether changes in Medicaid, state-level
economic condition, or state welfare
programs may be responsible for the
changes we attribute to the HITC. The
main finding appears to hold up to these

sensitivity tests—the estimates suggest
that the HITC increased health insurance
coverage of working single mothers by
about 6 percentage points.

“The President’s Proposed Standard
Deduction for Health Insurance: An
Evaluation.” Washington, DC: Tax Policy
Center, Urban Institute and Brookings
Institution, February 14.
Cebi, Merve, and Stephen A.
Woodbury. 2009. “Health Insurance
Tax Credits and the Health Insurance
Coverage of Low-Income Single
Mothers.” W.E. Upjohn Institute Staff
Working Paper no. 09-149. Kalamazoo,
MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, April.
Cogan, John F., Glenn R. Hubbard,
and Daniel P. Kessler. 2005. Healthy,
Wealthy, and Wise. Washington, DC, and
Stanford, CA: AEI Press and the Hoover
Institution.
Furman, Jason. 2008. “Health Reform
through Tax Reform: A Primer.” Health
Affairs 27(3): 622–632.

Conclusion
With a new administration in
Washington, and both houses of Congress
now led by Democrats, sweeping
reform of the U.S. health care system
is receiving far more attention than in
recent years. But as Zelinsky (2009)
notes, incremental change, or Charles
Lindblom’s “muddling through,” is
the style of change in democracy, so
employer-provided health benefits are
likely to remain a central feature of U.S.
health care financing for the foreseeable
future. It may be too early to dismiss
incremental policy changes that have
the potential to reduce health care costs
or increase access to health care. A
refundable tax credit for health insurance
directed toward low-income families—
like the HITC of the early 1990s—has
been espoused by many economists. The
estimates we describe here suggest that
the HITC increased health insurance
coverage of low-education working
single mothers by about 6 percentage
points. Perhaps the HITC should remain
in the health policy discussion after all.

Pauly, Mark V. 1999. “Extending
Health Insurance through Tax Credits.”
Menlo Park, CA: The Kaiser Project on
Incremental Health Reform, Henry J.
Kaiser Foundation, October.
U.S. Government Accountability
Office. 1994. Tax Administration: Health
Insurance Tax Credit Participation Rate
Was Low. Report to the Subcommittee on
Health, Committee on House Ways and
Means, Washington, DC: U.S. House of
Representatives.
Zelinsky, Edward A. 2009. “Muddling
Through: The Continuing Importance
of Employer-Provided Health Care.”
Working Paper no. 254. New York: Jacob
Burns Institute for Advanced Legal
Studies, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, February.
Merve Cebi is an assistant professor of
economics at the University of Massachusetts
Dartmouth, and Stephen A. Woodbury is a senior
economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute.
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Kristin S. Seefeldt

Women, Work,
and Welfare Reform
This article summarizes findings from the book,
Working After Welfare: How Women Balance
Jobs and Family in the Wake of Welfare
Reform, published in 2008 by the Upjohn
Institute (ordering information on p. 7–8).

M

ishon is a hotel housekeeper in
her early thirties with two teenagers. In
2004, she earned just over the minimum
wage. Instead of looking for a higherpaying job, she preferred to stay with her
current employer because her schedule
was stable, which allowed time in the
evenings to help her children with their
homework. Amanda, an office manager
earning about $10 an hour, said that
she too needed to spend time with her
children rather than return to school to
get a better job. “A lot of my time that I
could devote to education and to work,
I choose to spend on my children, and
that’s temporary,” she said. “Once the
kids are grown, I won’t have any real
reasons to keep me from growing and
moving ahead.”
Mishon and Amanda were part of the
Women’s Employment Study (WES),
which was originally designed to follow
about 750 Michigan welfare recipients
as they attempted to make the transition
from welfare to work. Over the course of
the study, the majority of women left the
welfare rolls for employment. However,
many policymakers and advocates have
noted that simply moving women from
welfare and into jobs does not make their
families self-sufficient. Indeed, studies in
several states following families leaving
welfare found that for women who
worked, wages were in the $7–$8 an hour
range (Acs and Loprest 2003).
When the WES surveys concluded,
researchers conducted in-depth
interviews in 2004 with some members of
the study, including Mishon and Amanda,
who had found jobs and had more or
less remained steadily employed. While
these women are typically considered
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the “successes” of welfare reform, many
faced challenges in moving further up
the economic ladder. Some found it
difficult to obtain jobs that paid higher
wages or to find opportunities to increase
their skills and thus their employment
options. But the most common theme
that emerged in women’s stories was the
challenge of balancing work and family
demands and the sacrifices women made
to their own career advancement so that
their children’s lives would be disrupted
as little as possible.
Working After Welfare: How Women
Balance Jobs and Family in the Wake of
Welfare Reform, which was published
last year by the Upjohn Institute,

Employment rates among
the sample climbed steadily
throughout 1997 and 1998 and
reached a peak in November
1999, when nearly 80 percent
of the women were employed.
explores issues related to employment
advancement using both the survey
and interview data from the Women’s
Employment Study. This article provides
highlights from the book.
The Women’s Employment Study
The WES is a panel survey that began
in 1997 and followed a random sample
of welfare recipients from one urban
Michigan county, collecting five waves
of survey data between 1997 and 2003.
All women were between the ages of 18
and 54 when the study began, received
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
in February 1997, and were African
American or white U.S. citizens.
Most of the sample left welfare by
2003 and did not return. Many of these
women worked in at least some months
during a year. Employment rates among

the sample climbed steadily throughout
1997 and 1998 and reached a peak in
November 1999, when nearly 80 percent
of the women were employed. In August
2003, the last month for which we have
employment data for all respondents,
just over two-thirds, 68.6 percent, were
employed.
Descriptive Findings on
Employment Transitions
Chapter 3 of the book presents
findings from a series of analyses looking
at the employment trajectories of the 421
women in the WES who were working
at the beginning of the study (1997 or
1998). I computed a wage that, assuming
full-time, full-year work, would still
leave a family of three (a single mother
and two children, the typical family in
the WES) below the federal poverty
line. In 1997 this rate was $6.15 an hour
(or $6.25 in 1998). I consider women
working in jobs paying those wages (or
less) to have below-poverty-wage jobs in
the initial period. In 2003, the comparable
wage rate for a below-poverty-wage job
is $7.05 an hour. I categorize women as
having above-poverty-wage jobs if their
hourly rates put them above the federal
poverty line. In 1997–1998, this would
translate into wage rates above $6.16–
$6.26.
Among respondents working in 1997
or 1998, 55.1 percent were in povertywage jobs and 44.9 percent were in
above-poverty-wage jobs. By 2003, a
much smaller proportion, 26.6 percent,
were in poverty-wage jobs, with 50.8
percent in above-poverty-wage jobs. The
remaining 22.6 percent reported no work
during 2003, and thus I categorize them
as being unemployed. As shown in Table
1, just over 17 percent of working sample
members started and ended the study
employed in poverty-wage jobs, or jobs
that paid less than $7.05 an hour (in 2003
dollars). A smaller fraction, 9 percent,
were working in above-poverty-wage
jobs (that is, jobs paying more than $7.05
an hour) when the study started, but by
2003 they were no longer being paid
this much and instead were in povertywage jobs. About a quarter moved from
poverty-wage jobs to above-poverty-
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Table 1 Employment Transitions, 1997–1998 to 2003, Workers with Valid Starting
Wages (n = 421)
Transition type
Poverty wage both periods
Poverty wage to above-poverty wage
Poverty wage to unemployment
Above-poverty wage both periods
Above-poverty wage to poverty wage
Above-poverty wage to unemployment

%
17.3
24.7
13.1
26.1
9.3
9.5

NOTE: A poverty-wage job is equivalent to $6.15 an hour or less in 1997 and $7.05 and hour in
2003.
SOURCE: Author’s tabulations from WES data.

wage jobs, while just over 9 percent
held an above-poverty-wage job in both
periods.
Selected Multivariate Findings
Regression analyses document that
a number of human capital problems,
such as not knowing proper workplace
behaviors, low levels of previous work
experience, and prior discrimination are
associated with ending the study in a
poverty-wage job or with unemployment.
Persistent transportation and health
problems were significantly related to
remaining in a poverty-wage job or
to becoming unemployed. This set of
findings suggests that the strong economy
of the late 1990s allowed some women to
get low-paying jobs but not necessarily
advance or enjoy stable employment.
These analyses provide some insight
into the types of barriers that keep people
in lower-paying jobs or contribute to
unemployment; however, they do not
shed light upon the actual processes
behind movements up or down the
employment ladder. Several chapters
in the book use information from
qualitative interviews with a number
of WES respondents to illustrate some
of the employment patterns described
above. Through in-depth discussions with
these women, I learned more about the
problems they encountered in finding and
keeping jobs and the choices and tradeoffs they made in balancing work and
family life.
Qualitative Findings
Tensions between motherhood and
career advancement opportunities,

whether it be decisions to return to
school or choices women make about
upward movement on the job, emerged
as perhaps the most striking common
feature across interviews. This was true
regardless of the wage level of the jobs in
which women worked. Women expressed
a strong desire to spend time with their
children and participate in their activities.
This desire sometimes got in the way of
further advancement.
Jackie, who worked in a grocery store,
did not apply for a promotion because
it meant transferring to a store farther
away. She explained how her daughter’s
schedule played a role in her employment

The strong economy of the
late 1990s allowed some
women to get low-paying jobs
but not necessarily advance or
enjoy stable employment.
decisions: “If it [the job] was in my store,
I probably would [apply], but if it was
somewhere else, I just can’t do it right
now because of my nine-year-old . . .
I’d have to get up earlier and I ain’t got
nobody here to get my daughter.”
Concerns about their children’s
well-being were also a main reason
that women put off participating in
education and training. Amanda, the
office manager of a law firm, represents
this struggle. She said, “My choices are
to take night classes and not be around
the kids, which I don’t like. They’re
teenagers—they need me at home now
more than they ever did . . . I have
daughters. My youngest has a boyfriend
now, so I don’t want to be one of those
moms and then complain later on, ‘Well,

what happened?’ If I take classes during
the day, I’m missing work, which is my
paycheck, so I can’t do that because my
paychecks are lower. I can’t do that.”
In fact, one-third of the women
we interviewed, when asked about
their greatest challenges to further
advancement, said that responsibilities
to their children prevented them from
moving up. A number of women believed
that once their children were grown, they
could devote time to themselves and
would be able to advance. Sierra held this
view, noting that her purpose for working
now was not to get ahead but to provide
for her children: “It’s my family and kids
right now. It [work] ain’t just for me,
basically right now it’s for the kids. I’ll
have my life later.” Of course, putting
children before job advancement did
mean that, generally, the family’s income
remained low.
Conclusion
Many former welfare recipients are
actively engaged in the labor market;
some have moved up the employment
ladder, but many others still earn
relatively low wages. Yet most women
we interviewed believed that their
chances to improve were limited because
of their responsibilities as parents. When
faced with a choice between higher
wages or control over their schedules,
many chose the latter. Policy could do
more not only to respect that decision
but to help families by better supporting
working parents.
Reference
Acs, Gregory, and Pamela Loprest.
2004. Leaving Welfare: Employment
and Well-Being of Families that Left
Welfare in the Post-Entitlement Era.
Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research.
Kristin S. Seefeldt holds a faculty research
appointment at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public
Policy at the University of Michigan and is the
assistant director of the National Poverty Center.
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W.E. Upjohn Institute Issue Brief
John S. Earle
Was mass privatization responsible for
the increased mortality in postcommunist
societies during the 1990s? This
claim appears in a recent article in the
British medical journal Lancet, and has
been subsequently reported in many
newspapers (see Stuckler, King, and
McKee 2000). The article documents
a robust correlation between the extent
of privatization and the adult male
mortality rate using country-level data for
about 24 economies of Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union. A storm
of controversy among defenders and
attackers of “shock therapy” policies has
ensued. While much of the discussion
is ideological, legitimate questions can
be raised about various aspects of the
methodology of the article, including the
use of country-level data to study death
and ownership—phenomena that are
inherently micro.
What requires more attention is
the question of causality: how could
changing ownership from state to private
have raised mortality? The Lancet
authors theorize that privatized firms
cut employment, and then refer to the
extensive evidence on the negative
impact of unemployment on health to
link job loss to mortality. But is the first
step valid; that is, does privatization
systematically lead to substantial job
loss? The Lancet article provides no
evidence on this question.
In a forthcoming study in the
Economic Journal (Brown, Earle, and
Telegdy forthcoming) we find that the
answer is a clear “no.” Our analysis
is not at the country level, as in the
Lancet article. The problem with such
aggregated data is that a variety of
confounding influences may explain
the results—just the sort of issues that
have heated up the blogosphere, but that
may never be resolved simply because
they cannot be measured. Instead, our
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analysis uses data on nearly every
manufacturing firm inherited from the
socialist period in four major transition
economies: Hungary, Romania, Russia,
and Ukraine. The firm is the level at
which decisions on employment are
made, and with our data we directly
observe ownership, employment, and
many other variables. Equally important,
we observe firms for many years (up to
20 years in these databases), so we can
follow the path of employment and other
variables for long periods both before and
after privatization takes place. We also
observe firms that are never privatized,
which together with those that are not
yet privatized (but will be) can form a
control group in examining the effect of
privatization on employment within a
particular industry and year. The ability
to compare firms within industries and
years—apples with apples, rather than
apples with oranges—is another benefit
of analyzing data at the level of the
decision maker, rather than the aggregate.
Analyzing these data with several
statistical methods to control for possible
biases due to selection of firms for
privatization, we find no evidence that
privatization systematically lowers firmlevel employment. Figure 1 contains
results with two alternative methods:
firm fixed effects and firm-specific
trends (labeled “without trends” and
“with trends” in the figure, respectively).
The estimated effects of privatization
to domestic owners are generally
positive, and where they are negative the
magnitudes are very small and usually
statistically indistinguishable from

zero. The estimated effects of foreign
privatization are almost always positive,
large, and statistically significant,
generally implying a 10–30 percent
expansion of employment following the
foreign acquisition. In the country with
the most (in)famous mass privatization,
Russia, the domestic privatization effects
are positive, and when estimated with
trends the effect is the largest of any
of these four countries. Analysis of the
long time series shows that the absence
of negative employment effects of
privatization is the consequence neither
of delayed restructuring several years
after privatization nor of preprivatization
downsizing, which is negligible in these
economies.
These empirical results strongly
contradict the notion, frequently assumed
but little investigated, that large job
cuts follow privatization. Why is this
assumption empirically incorrect? One
possibility is that privatization matters
little for firm behavior: new private
owners do not restructure and do not lay
off workers. Our research investigates
this possibility by decomposing the
employment effects of privatization
into two components, “productivity”
and “scale” effects. Holding the firm’s
scale—its level of production—constant,
an increase in productivity tends to lower
employment. Holding constant the level
of productivity, an increase in scale tends
to raise it.
Our empirical analysis of these
mechanisms finds that privatization tends
to raise both productivity and scale.
Both effects are much larger in firms

Figure 1 Estimated Privatization Effect on Employment
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New and Recent Books
The Power
of a Promise
Education and Economic
Renewal in Kalamazoo
Michelle Miller-Adams
When a group of anonymous donors
announced in 2005 that they would send
every graduate of the
Kalamazoo Public
Schools to college
for free, few within
or outside this midsized Michigan
community understood
the magnitude of
the gesture. In the
first comprehensive
account of the
Kalamazoo Promise, Michelle MillerAdams addresses both the potential and
challenges inherent in place-based universal
scholarship programs and explains why this
unprecedented experiment in education-based
economic renewal is being emulated by
scores of cities and towns across the nation.
“Michelle Miller-Adams captures the
truly unique story of the Kalamazoo Promise
without losing sight of the universal lessons it
offers us. [This book] is essential reading for
anyone who wants to understand the future
of economic and community development
in our country.” –Governor Jennifer M.
Granholm, State of Michigan
274 pp. 2009 $40 cloth 978-0-88099-340-1
$18 paper 978-0-88099-339-5

privatized to foreign investors, with
10–25 percent increases in productivity,
and 15–40 percent increases in scale.
The dominance of the scale over the
productivity effect implies the positive
impact of privatization that we observe
on employment.
In none of these countries do
we observe substantial job cuts due
to privatization. The causal link
hypothesized in the Lancet article is
not supported by the firm-level data.
Nor is it supported by other studies we
have carried out of layoffs and worker
turnover in privatized firms. Of course,
it is possible that some other link, not

Against the Tide
Household Structure,
Opportunities, and Outcomes
among White and Minority Youth
Carolyn J. Hill, Harry J. Holzer,
and Henry Chen

Working
After Welfare
How Women Balance
Jobs and Family in the
Wake of Welfare Reform
Kristin Seefeldt

The authors examine the effects of
household structure on young adults and
how these effects might have contributed
to the negative trends in employment and
educational outcomes
observed for young
minorities over time.
In addition to studying
these links, they
also provide a better
understanding of the
means through which
growing up in a singleparent household might
affect youth outcomes,
and they reveal other factors that might either
reinforce or counteract these household
effects.
The bottom line, say the authors, is that
young people growing up in single-parent
households face a combination of additional
challenges compared to young people growing
up in two-parent families, and that these
challenges, while not insurmountable, pose
a significant hurdle to achieving educational
and employment success.

In Working after Welfare: How Women
Balance Jobs and Family in the Wake of
Welfare Reform, we
experience the dayto-day struggles these
women face and the
reasons why they
tend to remain in
low-wage, dead-end
jobs. The hundreds
of women who were
followed in the WES
were not constrained
by the decision whether to work or to stay
home and raise their kids, but by one of
finding the right balance between caregiving
responsibilities and their families’ financial
and other needs. Interestingly, though, once
that balance was attained, many women
chose to remain in a job or forego additional
schooling even if it meant stagnant or
slow wage growth for fear of interrupting
their children’s schedules or because of an
unwillingness to spend less time with their
families.
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suggested by the article and unrelated
to employment outcomes, could explain
the observed privatization-mortality
correlation at the country level. Our
analysis suggests that further progress
on this question would benefit from
analysis of data at the level where the
action occurs: individual data in the case
of death, and firm data in the case of
privatization.

A Cross-National Analysis.” Lancet,
published online, January 15.
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